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Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of industry-level import competition and firm-level outsourcing with China and other low-wage countries on firm performances using firm-level data from Belgian manufacturing during the period 1996-2007. While we also study the effect of trade on employment growth and firm exit, the main contribution of our paper is to provide evidence on the effect of trade on within-firm skill upgrading. To the best of our knowledge, we also the first to provide IV estimates of the causal effect of firm-level outsourcing.
Since late 1980s, there has been a rising concern about the deteriorating situations of the low-skilled workers in the developed countries. Both job opportunities and wages for low-skilled workers are decreasing relative to high-skilled workers. Two explanations most often mentioned are: skill-biased technological change (or SBTC) and increased trade with developing countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant view among labor economists (and also some trade economists) was that technology was more important than trade as a driving force behind changes in the structure of employment.
However, some recent developments in trade theory, outlined in Section 2, have re-shifted the attention to the role of trade. Besides theory some recent phenomena, like the recent rapid growth of countries like India and China, have also contributed to the revival of the trade-based explanation. Compared to the main western countries' trade partners in the 80's, developing countries like India and China are endowed with a much bigger stock of low-skilled labor force at very competitive wages. The dramatically growing trade volumes with such countries may have thus affected low-skilled workers in the developed countries more than ever.
While studies about trade and skill upgrading are already abundant in the literature (see, for example, Feenstra and Hanson [1999] for the US, Hijzen et al. [2005] for the UK, Falk and Koebel [2002] for Germany, etc.), we innovate with respect to previous contributions in several ways.
First, we use both industry-level and firm-level trade data, as well as data on firm-level employment structure, to identify the impact of trade on skill upgrading. Indeed, due to data limitation, most of the research in the literature have been carried out at industry-level (with a few exceptions such as Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007) . By contrast, labor economists have provided a sizeable amount of firm-level evidence relating technological change and within firm skill upgrading 1 The failure to use firm-level data leads to at least two drawbacks. One, industry-level studies do not allow to distinguish whether skill upgrading is taking place within firms or between firms. Two, it is possible to split trade into import competing goods and outsourcing only by looking at the level of the firm. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) , which is arguably the closest related paper to ours, provide a descriptive view of the impact of outsourcing on French manufacturing while our purpose here is to identify the causal relationship of outsourcing (as well as import competition) on skill upgrading by using the IV method. 2 Second, we distinguish China from other low wage counties. While the distinction between imports from low-wage and non-low-wage countries is made by a few other papers in the skill upgrading literature, the distinction between imports from China and other low-wage countries is made, in the context of trade-induced technological change, only in Bloom et al. (2008) .
However, as Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008) show, Chinese exports have different characteristics with respect other other low-wage countries. Chinese exports are in fact more sophisticated and show more overlap with the products of developed countries. Indeed, our results suggest that treating China as a different animal is important.
Third, while most of the previous studies have used data up to the late 1990s, we use much more recent data from 1996 to 2007. This is important since trade with low-wage countries, and especially with China, has dramatically increased during the past decade. Fourth we use workers' education as a measure of skills, which is much more accurate than the crude distinction between production and nonproduction workers used in the literature (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996;  Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). However, in order to compare with previous research, we also report findings for production and non-production workers.
Following is a preview of our main findings. First, our results confirm that trade with lowwage countries is important in explaining skill upgrading. According to our IV estimations, imports from China alone can explain around 30 percent of the total skill upgrading in Belgian manufacturing during the period 1996-2007. Second, imports from China is much more important than imports from other low-wage countries, both in explaining skill upgrading and in explaining firm employment growth. Third, firm-level outsourcing to China will also induce skill upgrading and is beneficial for firm survival.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the theoretical background of our research. Section 3 provides a description of the data. Section 4 describes 2 There exist some firm-level studies relating skill upgrading within multi-national firms, such as Head and Ries (2002) for Japanese multinationals, Hansson (2005) for Swedish multinationals, and Castellani et al. (2008) for Italian multinationals. However, such contributions focus on a special group of firms (multinationals) only and it is thus questionable how to extend results to a larger spectrum of firms. Our paper also relates to some firm-level analysis about developing countries and trade, such as Bustos (2005) for Argentina and Eric Verhoogen (2008) for Mexico.
the econometric models and discusses main results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and points out directions for future research.
Theoretical Background

Trade and Skill Upgrading
As already mentioned, the favorite explanation for the increase in relative demand of skilled workers in developed countries is the 'skill-biased technological change' (SBTC). The main reasons that led economists to favor the SBTC explanation are as follows. First, skill upgrading was found to happen mainly within industries rather than between industries, which contrasts the prediction of traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994) . Second, skill upgrading not only occurred in developed countries but also in developing countries, which is again against the prediction of HO theory. Third, product-price studies found that the prices of labor intensive goods did not decrease significantly relative to skill intensive goods in developed countries. This violates the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993 , Leamer, 1996 , and Baldwin and Cain, 2000 . Finally, factor content calculation revealed that trade with developing countries was not important enough to have a major impact on employment structure in developed countries (see, e.g., Krugman, 1995) .
However, some recent developments in trade theory have made these critiques questionable.
First, trade liberalization may have altered the returns of different available technologies and lead to a skill-biased technological change that has ultimately pushed to a skill upgrading (Wood, that are newly offshored to developing countries tend to be more skill intensive than those already performed in developing countries. Moreover, since the production of skill intensive goods can also benefit from trade by outsourcing its most labor intensive stages to developing countries, prices can fall and this make it difficult to argue about any clear pattern in the prices of labor and skill intensive goods. Finally, offshoring (or production fragmentation), as Krugman (2008) pointed out, will also lead the traditional factor content calculation, which led Krugman (1995) to conclude that trade with developing countries was not important, to underestimate the effect of trade on the change of employment structure.
In short, there are reasons to believe that trade is important to explaining employment structure changes in the developed countries. However, we still have to spend few words about the mechanisms through which trade may induce within firm skill upgrading, since most of the above mentioned debate has an industry-level focus.
At first glance, although we have reasons to believe that trade with low-wage countries will increase the relative demand for skilled workers in developed countries, it does not necessarily mean that we should observe within firm skill upgrading. If firms are heterogeneous and face difficulties in changing their technology and/or their production process then the bulk of skill upgrading within an industry might happen across firms. However, there are at least three possibilities to rationalize within firm skill upgrading. First, trade may induce within firm technology upgrading, which may increase firm's relative employment of skilled workers. Second, multi-product firms may specialize in more skill intensive products when facing competition from low-wage imports, which will also induce within firm skill upgrading. Finally, firms have also the option to outsource the labor intensive stages of the production process to low-wage countries.
China is Different
There are at least two reasons to consider that with China separately in the analysis. First, Chinese exports are large in volume and increasing very quickly and China has a massive amount of un-skilled labor force which is paid a very competitive wage. All these aspects are worth to be considered. Second, the idea of including Chinese exports separately has a deeper foundation. Schott (2008) shows that China's export similarity with OECD countries, as measured by traded product's overlap, is higher than that of other non-OECD countries. Furthermore, China's similarity with OECD countries is growing faster that with respect to any other country. These findings highlight the fact that firms in developed countries may 'feel' more competitive pressure from Chinese exports than from other low-wage countries' exports.
On the other hand, some researches suggest that export data may overestimate the competi- 
Data
Industry-level Trade and Production Data
The industry-level imports data comes from the ComExt Intra-and Extra-European Trade Data, which is a harmonized and comparable statistical database for EU countries merchandize trade.
The database is compiled by Eurostat, using statistics from the member states. We extract data We use the variable import share to measure the degree of import competition from different country groups at the four digit NACE code industry level. Let IM P SHARE c jt denote the import share of country group c of the goods produced by industry j in year t. Import share is defined as following:
where M c jt and M jt represent (respectively) the value of imports from country group c and all countries. P jt is domestic production of industry j in year t and comes from the Prodcom Production Data also provided by Eurostat. There are some exceptions. Some enterprizes do not have to file any annual accounts. 4 For this study, we selected those companies with their main activity in the manufacturing sector that filed a full-format or abbreviated balance sheet between 1996 and 2007. This provides us with about 15,000 firms per year for which all the relevant information is available. The data coverage, compared with other European firm-level data, is particularly good. For example, despite France has almost 6 times more manufacturing employment than Belgium, the well known French EAE manufacturing firms database contains data on about 'only' 25,000 firms.
Firm-level data
Using the information from the balance sheet data, we construct a battery of firms' characteristics. Wage per worker is used as a proxy for skill intensity. Tangible assets per worker is used as measure for capital intensity. Value added per worker and log employment are used as measures for labor productivity and firm size, respectively. As standard in the empirical Industrial Organization literature we also consider firm age. Finally, we use intangible assets per worker to control for technology-related spending within the firm.
As for dependant variables, employment growth is defined as log difference of firm's total employment between year t and year t + 1. Firm exit is defined as disappearing from the data set for two consecutive years. Share of production workers is defined as the ratio of manual workers to total employment. While most of the papers in the literature only use the share of production workers to measure skill, we are able to do better thanks to a unique feature of the data. In particular, we are able to track, for firm with full-format balance sheets, the education level of workers that enter or exit the workforce of a firm in each year. Using this information, we are able to construct a proxy for the share of skilled workers (see section 4) based on education. We define a skilled worker as a worker having more than secondary school education (ISCED levels 5 3 Under the Belgian Company Code, a company is regarded as large if: the annual average of its workforce exceeds 100 persons or more than one of the following criteria are exceeded: 1) annual average of workforce: 50; 2) annual turnover (excluding VAT): 7,300,000 euro; 3) balance sheet total: 3,650,000 euro. 4 These include: sole traders; small companies whose members have unlimited liability: general partnerships, ordinary limited partnerships, cooperative limited liability companies; large companies whose members have unlimited liability, if none of the members is a legal entity; public utilities; agricultural partnerships; hospitals, unless they have taken the form of a trading company with limited liability; health insurance funds, professional associations, schools and higher education institutions.
and 6).
Firm-level import data are also provided by the NBB. More precisely, the information comes from intra-EU (Intrastat) and extra-EU (Extrastat) trade declarations that cover the universe of trade transactions. 5 The two sources of information were merged using the value added tax number, which identifies each firm. Data are extremely rich and comparable in quality to the widely known French Customs data used in Eaton et al (2004) as CN8 products that correspond to the same 3-digit NACE code of the main activity of the firm. 6 Other imports are defined as imports of intermediate goods. Then outsourcing of finished goods to country group c is defined as:
Where M F c it is imports of finished goods from country group c, N it is total turnover. Outsourcing of intermediate goods from country group c is defined in a similar way.
Instrumental Variables
In order to solve the potential endogeneity problem of import variables, we use exchange rate and ad valorem tariff data to construct instrumental variables for both industry-level and firm-level imports. Exchange rate data comes from the IFS database, compiled by the IMF. Ad valorem tariff data is from the online customs tariff database, also called the TARIC, provided by European Commission. Such dataset integrates all tariff-like restrictions applying to goods that enter the EU market by country of origin and CN8 code for several years. Although the database contains information about many trade restrictive measures (like quotas, weight-based tariff, etc.) we only use ad valorem tariffs to construct our IVs. The construct a comprehensive trade barrier index that utilizes information on all trade measures is in fact both cumbersome and highly questionable.
For this reason we decided to focus on ad valorem tariff data only.
Using country specific exchange rates data we have constructed country-group/industry spe-5 For intra-EU trade there are relatively small thresholds above which a legal obligation to declare arises. However, in many cases firms do provide information about their trade even when they are below the threshold. Extra-EU is virtually exhaustive with the legal requirement for declaration being a value of 1,000 euros or more or a weight of 1,000 kg or more. 6 A precise correspondence cific and country-group/firm specific IVs for industry-level imports and firm-level imports by using trade ratios as weights. We denote by IV EXCH c jt the exchange rate IV for import share of country group c in industry j on year t, and by IV EXCHF IN c it the exchange rate IV for outsourcing of finished goods from country group c in firm i on year t (firm-level exchange rate IVs for outsourcing of intermediate goods are constructed in similar way). We construct them as follows:
where h denotes country, E denotes exchange rate, 0 denotes the initial value (i.e., value in 1995) of the corresponding variable. We use the initial trade ratio rather than current trade ratio, because current trade ratio may be endogenous. We use turnover rather than total imports as the denominator in the second equation because otherwise the variable would not be defined for non-trading firms.
Similarly, denoting IV DU T Y c jt as tariff IV for import share of country group c in industry j on year t, and IV DU T Y F IN c it as tariff IV for outsourcing of finished goods from country group c in firm i on year t (IVs for outsourcing of intermediate goods are constructed similarly), we construct IVs using tariff data as follows (where D denotes ad valorem tariff, p denotes an 8-digit CN product code , and f denotes finished goods):
Results
We look at the impact of import competition and outsourcing on four firm adjustment margins:
employment growth, share of blue collar workers, share of skilled (highly educated) workers and firm exit. The explanatory variables are similar in all equations, i.e., firm-level controls, industrylevel imports and firm-level imports.
∆ ln emp 
Equation 2 is similar as Equation 1, but the dependant variable now becomes the skill structure of firm employment. We use two measures for S it . One is the share of production workers and the other is the share of skilled workers (workers with higher than secondary school education). The share of production workers can be calculated directly from the data, but share of skilled workers is not directly available. We have the educational level of workers entering and quitting a firm in each year that we use to construct a proxy for S it based on the following decomposition:
where skill is the number of skilled workers, emp is the total employment, and skill net f low 0:t i is the net inflow (i.e., inflow minus outflow) of skilled workers between year 0 and year t for firm i. The only thing on the righthand side of the equation that is unobservable in our data is skill i0 , which is the initial number of skilled workers in firm i. We used the initial number of non-production workers as a proxy for skill i0 .
Finally, we estimate a linear probability model for firm exit:
Where Death it is a dummy indicating firm exit. We defined a firm as exiting in t if it disappears from the data set for at least two consecutive years (t and t + 1).
For all the three equations above, we used exchange rate and ad valorem tariff data to construct IV's for industry-level and firm-level trade. The estimation results are shown in Tables 1 to 4 . Table 1 shows the results for equation 1 . Tables 2 and 3 show the results for equation 2, while We use robust standard errors and statistics. At the bottom of each Table we Table 1 Tables 2 and 3 summarize the relationship between import competition, outsourcing and firm's relative demand for skilled workers. The first two columns of each table report the within estimator coefficients while the remaining columns report IV results In all the regressions, we include year and firm fixed effects to control for aggregate trends in firm's demand for skilled workers and unobserved (time-invariant) firm characteristics.
Employment Growth
Skill upgrading
From the first two columns in Tables 2 and 3 , one can see that only import competition from China has a positive and significant effect on both measures of 'skill upgrading' within the firm.
The coefficient is in fact negative for the share of blue-collar workers and positive for the share of skilled (i.e. having more than a secondary education) workers. As for firm-level imports by country groups, estimates indicate that outsourcing generally induce within-firm skill upgrading by reducing the share of production workers. Results for the share of skilled workers are by contrast not significant.
From the IV estimates, we get broadly similar results. For industry-level trade, we again find that only Chinese imports have a significant effect on the workforce composition leading to upgrading, both in terms of occupation and education. If we consider the point estimate from column 5 of Table 3 (downgrading), which suggest that China is also different from OECD countries. However, for this last set of results caution is need as firm outsourcing with this country group is not instrumented.
Finally, outsourcing seems to have no effect on the share of skilled workers.
Together with the results in Section 4.1, we can deduce that import competition from China reduces firm employment but leads firms to upgrade their workforce both in terms of occupation types and education. Meanwhile, firm-level outsourcing to China will only change the occupational composition of firm employment, but not the level of employment. When combined with the results from the previous two sections, the finding that import competition from China has no effect on firm exit can be somewhat surprising. One possible interpretation is that, even though import competition from China reduces firm employment, it also pushes firms to upgrade their employment structure which may ultimately make them no more likely to die. Overall, we see our results as consistent with the 'moving up the quality ladder' story by Schott (2008) : manufacturing firms in developed countries can manage to survive to the extent that they are able to specialize in the production of high quality goods.
Firm exit
Conclusion
Imports from low-wage countries, and especially China, have been the fastest growing component of Belgian trade during the last decade. This paper considers separately the role of imports from China and other low-wage countries in Belgian manufacturing firms outcomes. Unlike most previous research, we consider two different channels for the impact of imports: industry-level import competition and firm-level outsourcing. We further innovate by providing IV results for both import types.
We find that trade with low-wage countries is important in explaining within firm employment structure change in Belgian manufacturing, with imports from China playing a much more important role than that from other low-wage countries. We find that industry-level import competition from China reduces firm employment but pushes firms to upgrade their workforce both in terms of occupation and in terms of education. According to our estimations, import competition from China alone can explain around 30% of the total skill upgrading in Belgian manufacturing during the period 1996-2007. Meanwhile, outsourcing from China leads firms to upgrade their occupational structure without affecting employment growth. Interestingly, import competition from both China and other low-wage countries does not affect firm exit while there is some evidence that outsourcing from China actually increases a firm chances to survive. Overall, we see our results as consistent with the 'moving up the quality ladder' story of Schott (2008) .
Finally, we propose two directions for future research. First, we acknowledge that is extremely difficulty to instrument firm-level trade. Although we provide for the first time IV results for firm outsourcing, results are certainly not fully satisfactory in terms of instruments' strength. Second, while we have explored the impact of trade with low-wage countries on several aspects of firm outcomes, there are other margins of adjustment that firms can use when facing import competition, such as product line switching, quality upgrading and technology upgrading. Evidence on these margins is still limited, especially when we take into account the special role played by Chinese trade. 
